Democracy with sequential choice and fund voting

Abstract

[Úr inngangi:] Anyone involved in politics or running a society will be familiar with the problems involved in putting issues to the vote or holding an election. The purpose of this book is to set forth and explain two voting methods that solve these problems and, in fact, prevent them from arising: sequential choice and fund voting. They give voters the chance to use their ballot papers to express their wishes in novel ways, with a corresponding effect on the outcome. Attention will also be given to the implications for public affairs if these methods were adopted. This book presents a method which enables the voter to show, on the ballot paper, varying degrees of support for completely separate issues, or for variants of a single issue. This is fund voting. The reader whose main interest lies here can turn immediately to Part III; it is not necessary to have read Parts I and II beforehand. When people back down on an issue, they know what they really wanted but were unsuccessful in achieving. When politicians work out a compromise, on the other hand, it may not be clear to a third party what they really wanted and what concessions they made. With sequential choice and fund voting those involved show what they really want, what they want least and what alternatives they consider lie in between. A simple example will show how making a proposal that is completely in accordance with one’s own convictions can damage one’s own position. Let us assume that an issue is to be put to the vote. Two motions have been submitted; one of them is thought to have the support of the majority. Jill is one of those who support it; nevertheless, she would prefer to have it changed slightly. If she puts forward her own version as a third motion and all three are put to the vote, she runs the risk that the motion she is least in favour of will be passed. With sequential choice, this risk would not arise. It sometimes happens in elections that voters are urged not to waste their votes but to vote for the candidate that they regard as the second best choice, or even one lower down the scale. This is because voting for the candidate of their choice could increase the chances of their least favoured candidate being elected. The single transferable vote (Hare’s method), which is described in this book, removes this danger. Another method that reduces the likelihood of the voter facing such a dilemma is described in this book. It can also be used when issues involving more than two alternatives are put to the vote. This is sequential choice. The development of various voting and election methods has a long history. The book deals with this to some extent, with the main aim of the book being to describe sequential choice and fund voting and to explain the qualities of these methods. Sequential choice and fund voting have been tried out in Iceland. 1 Admittedly, no extensive experience has been gained as yet, but a description of actual examples gives an insight into the use of the methods that can scarcely be gained from a theoretical discussion alone. The examples described below illustrate the main features of the two methods.